Sunga: The emerging system of international criminal law: Developments in codification and implementation; T.
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
McCormack and G. Review of Timothy L. McCormack and Gerry J. DEC, Recent Trends in English Penal Policy. What can be Done About Crime?
Coleman and Shapiro: The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
Review of M. Oxford University Press, Oxford. MNTH 2, Review of Frankin E. Law Quarterly Review. Will you stand up in court? On the admissibility of psychiatric and psychological evidence Journal of Forensic Psychiatry. The admissibility of expert evidence: Lessons from America Expert Evidence. Routledge, Criminal Law Review. Review of A. ISSUE 10, Expert Systems Solicitors' Journal. This leads us into a critique of species-relativism about value.
We defend the thesis that all value is value for everything. This draws us into some reflections on the importance of ability and disability, and in particular on the practical importance for rational beings of that which they cannot attain. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without.
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Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I try to show how much of the law of torts this thesis helps to explain, but also what it leaves unexplained. I attempt to provide textual support for the view that Hart did find necessary connections - many of them - between law and morality. The bulk of the comment is devoted to exploring just one indirect necessary connection between law and morality that Hart may have noticed in The Concept of Law, viz. I find Hart surprisingly ambivalent about the last link in this chain, but do not find in this ambivalence any solace for Simmonds.
Scott J. Shapiro
My discussion raises a wide range of conceptual and doctrinal questions about Thorburn's account of justification defences, and about the theory of justfication defences more generally. The paper also trespasses on some broader questions about the nature of law and its relationship to morality. I ask, in particular, how we are to read the words 'simply in virtue of'. Are we speaking of who has the rights A has them if and only if he or she is human or why they have the rights A has them because and only because he or she is human?
Griffin brings the two readings together, as two sides of the same coin. He offers a more or less universalistic case for more or less universalistic rights. I try to show how the two readings can be driven apart, how the universality of human rights need not be undermined merely by there being no adequate universalistic case for them. On the strength of this discussion I suggest an inversion of the relationship that is often thought to hold between human rights and human dignity.
In a way our rights give us our dignity, not vice versa. She received a Ph. Louis, using positron emission tomography and functional magnetic resonance imaging fMRI. After serving two years as senior editor of Neuron , she went on to complete a Ph. Roskies joined the Dartmouth faculty in the fall of She has been a visiting fellow in philosophy at the Australian National University and the University of Sydney. Roskies is the author of numerous articles published in academic journals. Timothy Schroeder received his B.
He works on the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, and these interests intersect in his book, Three Faces of Desire Oxford, Walter publishes widely in normative moral theory, meta-ethics, applied ethics, moral psychology and neuroscience, philosophy of law, epistemology, informal logic, and philosophy of religion. He has defended atheism, consequentialism, contrastivism, limited moral skepticism, and irresolvable moral dilemmas. His current research focuses on empirical moral psychology and neuroscience including experiments on psychopaths and on the diversity of moral judgments and on the implications of neuroscience for the legal system and for free will and moral responsibility including the responsibility of addicts and people with mental illnesses, including scrupulosity.
He is the general editor of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility , and he has published numerous articles on personal identity and ethics, agency and responsibility, and the nature of the moral community. He received his B. Stephen P. He has written extensively on issues in cognitive science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, moral theory, and philosophical methodology. She has studied morality as it intersects with emotion, identity, and social behavior.
Her papers have appeared in Psychological Science , Science , and Cognition. In her free time, Nina hangs out with philosophers. Her work explores the ways in which philosophy and psychology can both contribute to the study of well-being and virtue. She is the author of The Reflective Life: Living Wisely With Our Limits Oxford , Moral Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction Routledge and numerous articles on the topics of practical reasoning, prudential virtues, well-being, and the relationship between psychology and ethics.
He pursues research in philosophy, law, and cognitive science—most of which is empirically engaged or experimental. Manuel R. His work focuses on questions of agency at the intersection morality, psychology, and the law. He also writes about topics in Latin American philosophy.
Interested in externalist perspectives in philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science, and in understanding the ways in which minds and environments interact, her current research focuses on the theoretic and conceptual foundations of mental health and human nature in the philosophy of psychiatry. She has also done work on implicit bias and moral responsibility, and on the effects of implicit cognition on medical industry interaction with doctors and medical students.
She studies the cognitive and neural basis of human moral judgment, focusing especially on the roles of emotion and mental state reasoning. Her work employs the methods of cognitive neuroscience: functional neuroimaging, studying patient populations with specific cognitive and neural deficits, and modulating activity in specific brain areas using transcranial magnetic stimulation. Young received her Ph. In Young was awarded the William James Prize by the Society of Philosophy and Psychology for a paper on moral judgment in patients with brain damage. Doris, J.
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law : Kenneth Himma :
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greene, J. Penguin Press. Kelly, D.
The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust. Cambridge: MIT Press. Mikhail, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reader in Legal Theory;
- Label 228: A Street Art Project.
- Legal Positivism.
Machery, E. Doing without Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press. Knobe, J.
Experimental Philosophy. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Tiberius, V. Moral Skepticisms. Nichols, S. Schroeder, T. Three Faces of Desire. Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cushman, F. Joyce, K. Sterelny, B. Fraser Eds. Beall, E. Graham, J. Social Psychological and Personality Science. When values and behavior conflict: Moral pluralism and intrapersonal moral hypocrisy.
Social and Personality Psychology Compass.
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Koleva, S. Sison Ed. Springer: New York. Scherer, A.